On the Empirics of Foreign Aid and Growth. by Carl-Johan Dalgaard et al.
EPRU 
 
Economic Policy Research Unit 
Institute of Economics 
University of Copenhagen 
Studiestræde 6 
DK-1455 Copenhagen K 
DENMARK 
Tel: (+45) 3532 4411 










On the Empirics of Foreign Aid and Growth 
 
 
Carl-Johan Dalgaard, Henrik Hansen  
and Finn Tarp 
 
2003-13 




















The activities of EPRU are financed by a grant from 
The National Research Foundation On the Empirics of Foreign Aid and Growth∗
Carl-Johan Dalgaard† Henrik Hansen‡ Finn Tarp‡
First version: December 2001
This version: September 2003
Abstract
This paper takes a fresh look at two issues in the aid eﬀectiveness debate. We
begin by providing theoretical foundations for the various claims made with regard
to the eﬀectiveness of aid in stimulating long-run productivity. When foreign aid is
modelled as an exogenous transfer of income or capital in a standard OLG model,
aid wil in general impact on productivity. Moreover in this setting, the “returns to
aid” may depend on both policy and structural characteristics. Next we reexamine
the case for policy-based conditionality. Our empirical analysis suggests that aid is
generally eﬀective, even in “bad” environments. However, the degree to which aid
enhances growth depends on climate-related circumstances. In light of this ﬁnding
we argue that the Collier-Dollar allocation rule should be seriously reconsidered by
donor agencies.
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11 Introduction
The usefulness of foreign aid in promoting growth in developing countries has been an
area of controversy ever since Rosenstein-Rodan in 1943 advocated for aid to Eastern
and South-Eastern Europe. Browsing through successive editions of a leading textbook
in development economics provides a telling illustration of how the conﬁdence in aid
eﬀectiveness dwindled over the years. In the ﬁrst edition of “Leading Issues in Economic
Development”, Meier (1964) dedicated a full 18-page section to the issue of foreign aid.
He started out asking: “How much aid?”. By the time of the sixth edition (Meier, 1995),
the treatment of foreign aid had been cut into half, and the questions in focus were “Why
oﬃcial assistance?” and “Does aid work?”. In the 2000 edition (Meier and Rauch, 2000),
“foreign aid” is not even listed in the index.
However, in the last few years the pendulum has swung, and a gradually forming con-
sensus view has emerged that aid ”works”. Indeed, panel-based empirical studies have
repeatedly concluded that foreign aid does impact positively on growth. Nevertheless,
controversy remains since it also seems clear from the data that foreign aid is far from
equally eﬀective everywhere. A key question is therefore what causes such diﬀerences in
”the return to aid”?
From a policy perspective, this issue is important as it ultimately inﬂuences the allocation
of foreign aid across countries. Inspired by the work of Burnside and Dollar (2000) and
Collier and Dollar (2001, 2002), which suggests that aid only works in places with ”good”
policies, some donors are increasingly allocating aid to countries which perform well in
terms of particular proxies for the policy environment. The motivation is clearly the
desire to maximize the eﬀectiveness of tax ﬁnanced foreign assistance. However, if the
variation in the eﬀectiveness of aid on productivity is not policy induced, but rather a
result of other poor initial conditions a very diﬀerent allocation rule would maximize the
eﬀect of aid donations on long-run productivity and poverty.
In this paper we begin by ﬂeshing out theoretical foundations for the various claims made
with regard to the eﬀectiveness of aid in stimulating long-run productivity. Foreign aid
is modelled as an exogenous transfer of income or capital, and the underlying economic
framework is the overlapping generations model due to Diamond (1965). We parameterize
the inﬂuence of the government, and proceed to examine the conditions under which
foreign aid enhances long-run productivity. In general, the impact of aid on steady state
productivity is ambiguous. In particular, suﬃciently poor economic management, on the
part of the government, may render foreign aid ineﬀective. At the same time, however,
deep determinants of productivity (factors that shift the production function) turn out to
matter as well. Hence, ”strong” fundamental structural characteristics (like institutions
and/or climate-related circumstances) may compensate for a bad policy environment. If,
in the end, aid does have a positive eﬀect on long-run productivity, diminishing returns
may prevail. As such, it becomes evident that the driving force behind the variation in
the degree of aid eﬀectiveness is for empirical work to resolve.
Against this background we therefore proceed to the empirical evidence on the aid-growth
nexus. After a brief review of key ﬁndings in the literature we go on to examine the
importance of underlying structural characteristics for the return to aid. To avoid further
problems with endogeneity, we use a measure of climatic circumstances (fraction of land
2in tropical areas) as a proxy for ”deep” structural charactaristics. This new speciﬁcation,
involving the interaction between aid and a climate-related variable, outperforms two of
the more popular aid-growth relations in recent studies; the Burnside and Dollar (2000)
policy interaction model and the diminishing returns model advocated by Dalgard and
Hansen (2001), Hansen and Tarp (2000, 2001) and Lensink and White (2001). The
ﬁnding that aid seems to be less eﬀective in the geographic tropics is robust to changes
in estimation techniques and the underlying data.
There are a number of possible interpretations of this ﬁnding. The most obvious is that
climate may matter directly for productivity, as it conceivably matters for how eﬀective
individual countries are in combining capital and labor to produce output; especially
since many of the countries in the sample are reliant on agricultural production (e.g.
Bloom and Sachs, 1998; Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger, 1999; Sachs, 2001, 2003 and Mas-
ters and McMillan, 2001). Second, climatic circumstances may, for various reasons, have
inﬂuenced the evolution of other slow-moving structural characteristics, like institutions
(Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu et al, 2001, Easterly and Levine, 2003, and others).
As a result, the new interaction term may reﬂect that (exogenous) variation in institu-
tions matter for the impact of aid on productivity. But regardless of the precise modus
operandi the ﬁnding suggests, consistent with the theoretical model, that aid has been
more eﬀective in places with stronger slow-moving (or even time-invariant) structural
characteristics.
In light of these ﬁndings we proceed to discuss the implications for the aid allocation rule
proposed by Collier and Dollar (2001, 2002). Collier and Dollar suggest an allocation rule
based on an ”inverted” growth regression, in which the impact of aid varies with policy
performance measured by the World Bank’s CPIA index. The resulting rule states that
aid should be directed towards poor countries with good policies (high CPIA scores).
We ﬁnd a strong negative correlation between climatic conditions and CPIA ratings.
Moreover, we document that the CPIA index is likely to be Granger caused by past
growth performance. These ﬁndings lead us to question, not only the interpretation, but
also the wisdom in using this allocation rule.
To summerize, the structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 examines the eﬀectiveness
of aid theoretically, after which Section 3 is devoted to the empirics of foreign aid and
growth. We summarize the debate, but we also present new results and provide a rigorous
dicussion of issues related to the identiﬁcation of the impact of aid on productivity. After
discussing the implications of aid-eﬀectivness for aid allocations in Section 4, a ﬁnal
section of the paper is devoted to concluding remarks.
2 Aid Transfers and Growth Theory
Consider a two-period Diamond (1965) model augmented by an inﬂux of aid. Accordingly,
all markets are competitive, the economy is closed (except for the transfer), the population
is growing at the rate n > 0 and, for simplicity, there is no technological progress. For
brevity capital depreciation is also ignored. Perfect competition in factor markets imply
that for any standard neoclassical production function exhibiting constant returns to
labor and capital, GDP per worker, yt, the real rate of interest, rt, and the real wage
3in eﬃciency units, wt, are uniquely determined – at any given point in time – by the
capital/labor ratio, kt. Hence yt = y (kt), rt = r(kt) and wt = w(kt), respectively.
Each period a ﬁxed (in per capita terms) transfer of resources, x, enters the budget
of consumers. Since the overlapping generations (OLG) framework inherently contains
heterogenous agents it is necessary to specify how these transfers are divided between
young and old citizens.
At time t there exists L
y
t young agents, and Lo
t old agents (L
y
t = (1+n)Lo
t). Hence, if the
transfer is distributed equally across all the agents simultaneously alive, each group should
be allocated a fraction of x equal to their respective population share. This would imply
that the young obtain the share πy = 1+n
2+n whereas the reminder, πo = 1
2+n, is allocated
to the old citizens. In practice, however, foreign aid inﬂows are typically managed by
the government. As a result, it is not obvious that the aid inﬂow will be distributed in
this ”neutral” fashion. So in order to examine the implications of varying distributive
rules, or the diversion of the transfer by the government, we assume the representative
young household receives a transfer of the amount πyx while the representative old get
πox. If “expropriation” is present this implies that πy + πo < 1. Since “sound” economic
management manifests itself in the way foreign aid is distributed, we may think of both
the allocation of the transfer (i.e. the ratio πo/πy) as well as the levels of πo and πy as
reﬂecting the ”policy environment” in aid receiving nations. Speciﬁcally “bad policies”
are associated with low levels of πo and πy as well as a disproportional allocation of
resources to the non-investing citizens (here: the old). In practice this allocation decision
is likely to be endogenous, and could reﬂect the power-struggle between competing interest
groups and/or the incentives of the government to expropriate funds.1 A number of papers
in the literature have examined such channels, among them Boone (1996), Tornell and
Lane (1999) and Svensson (2000). For present purposes, however, we will maintain the
assumption that (πo,πy) are parameters. This will allow us to see clearly how government
policies are mapped into the investment decision of the citizens, and ultimately inﬂuences
”the return to foreign aid”.
Naturally, “policies” could be parameterized in various ways. For example one could add
taxes to the model. As will be apparent momentarily this would not change any of the
basic insights gained by parameterizing policy by (πo,πy). In particular, the impact of
changing the tax rate on capital income will be indistinguishable from an appropriate
change in the πy/πo ratio.
Aside from these issues the structure of the model is the familiar one. People live only for
two periods. In the ﬁrst period of life they supply one unit of labor inelastically, they re-
ceive a transfer of resources, consume and save. In the second period of life, they consume
the return on ﬁrst period savings and an contemporary transfer. Assuming utility from
consumption in youth and during old-age is logarithmic, and that consumers discount
the future at the rate ρ, it is straight forward to solve the problem of a representative
young household. Since the capital stock in period t + 1 derives solely from the savings
of the young agents, it can subsequently be shown that the law of motion for capital per
1It is very plausible that such channels could be quantitatively important for the eﬀectiveness of aid.
For example, Reninikka and Svensson (2002) ﬁnd that massive amounts of funds, intended for primary
schooling in Uganda during the period 1991-95, seemingly disappeared. The authors also document that
the extent of ”leakage” seems to vary across countries. At the same time, however, it is worth noting
that some funds do ﬁnd their way through the system. In terms of the model: πo + πy may be ”small”;
but this term is not zero.
4worker is:
kt+1 ≡ s(kt,kt+1;z)/(1 + n) (1)

















The savings rate of the young, σ ≡ 1/(2 + ρ) is independent of the real rate of interest
due to the assumption of log-utility. Appendix A discusses the formal properties of this
model. In general it allows for both uniqueness and multiplicity of steady states. In
what follows we focus on the case where the economy approaches a unique steady state




∗;z)/(1 + n), (3)
It now follows immediately that:
Proposition 1 (Transfers in the Diamond model) A permanent increase in the level
of foreign aid per capita aﬀects steady state productivity. Whether the transfer increases
or decreases steady state production per worker depends on: (i) Policies (πy,πo), (ii) The
production technology.
Accordingly, under very mild assumptions a foreign aid transfer will have a long-run
impact on productivity. This result is in striking contrast to the result established in
Obstfeldt (1999) where a symmetrical analysis is conducted, but within a Ramsey-Cass-
Koopmans (RCK) model. In the RCK model a very strong result holds:
Proposition 2 (Transfers in the RCK model) A permanent increase in the level of
foreign aid (which enters the budget of the consumers) will raise the long-run level of per
capita consumption one for one, but it leaves the steady state level of capital per worker
unaﬀected.
In other words, aid is ineﬀective even when the inﬂuence of the government is ignored.
This result is invariant to assumptions made regarding production technology, i.e. whether
growth is exogenous or endogenous (see Obstfeldt, 1999). Thus, unless the model is some-
how modiﬁed, aid is bound to be ineﬀective if the goal is to raise long-run productivity.2
However, as the present analysis makes clear; this ”aid ineﬀectiveness result” is not due
to the assumption of optimizing households. Instead it follows from the assumption that
households act as if they live for ever (”perfect” altruism).3
2The political-economy analysis by Boone (1996) is cast within a RCK model. For this reason aid
only works in the model if it entices the government to lower distorting taxes on capital accumulation.
3Suppose the present OLG model is modiﬁed so as to allow households to obtain utility from the
utility of their descendants and to pass on bequest. Then, if utility within and across generations are
discounted at the same rate the ”RCK solution” obtains (e.g. Blanchard and Fischer, 1989, Ch.3). As
a result, in this sort of an OLG model, aid would be unable to aﬀect long-run productivity.
5We now return to the present framework. Although aid clearly ”matters” it does not
follow that it will be productive. Indeed, near the steady state there is a simple condition










y > 0. (4)
Clearly, ∂k∗/∂x > 0 if the return to capital investments, r∗, is suﬃciently high. Hence
factors which shift the production technology upwards, and as a result increases the
return to investments for any kt, will tend to make it more likely that aid stimulates
long run productivity. At the same time, however, suﬃciently ”bad” policies (i.e. a
counterproductive allocation of resources across agents) may render aid ineﬀective in
raising long-run production. The intuition for the above condition is simple. Assume for
the moment that πo
πy = 1. Under this assumption, aid will increase savings in so far as
r∗ > ρ. Increasing the level of aid, means that income in both periods of life is increased.
If the optimal consumption-age proﬁle is upward sloping, which corresponds to r∗ > ρ,
the consumer will respond to this “windfall gain” by increasing savings so as maintain
the desired proﬁle. On the other hand, if r∗ < ρ the opposite occurs. Consequently, it is
not surprising that insofar as the aid transfer grows over the life cycle (πo
πy > 1) then it
becomes more likely that the consumer will cut savings, in response to an upward shift
in the level of aid, so as to smooth consumption.5
Finally, as a prelude to the empirical discussion in what follows, we may use the model
to clarify the alternative views that have been put forward in the recent aid-eﬀectiveness
debate.
First, the notion that policies are crucial in determining whether (and to which extent)
foreign aid raises long-run productivity is reﬂected in the empirical strategy of Burnside
and Dollar (2000) and Collier and Dollar (2001, 2002). They ﬁnd that aid only works
in places featuring a suﬃciently sound policy environment. As we have just seen; poli-
cies matter in themselves, and suﬃciently ”poor” policies may render aid ineﬀective in
spurring growth.
Second, as is also clear from equation (3), the relationship between aid and long-run
productivity is rather complicated. While policy and aid both have a direct impact
on long-run productivity they matter in highly nonlinear fashions, and are mutually
intertwined. Accordingly, in a reduced form sense we may think of long run productivity,
y∗ as being a function, Θ(·), of foreign aid, x, policies, π, and various other factors, δ, to
which we shall return:
y
∗ = Θ(x,π,δ). (5)
For the purposes of estimation this expression could be linearized. A second order Taylor
approximation of Θ(·) would then yield various quadratic terms in π and x, along inter-
action terms involving x and π. The empirical work of Hansen and Tarp (2000, 2001)
and Dalgaard and Hansen (2001) is founded in this view. The essential ﬁnding is that
4See Appendix A.
5It is interesting to note how (4) relates to a RCK model. Suppose we have an equal amount of old
and young agents present (say by setting n = 0). Consequently, let πo = πy. Now, in a RCK model the
real rate of return is pinned down by the rate of time preference, ρ. Hence if we assume that r∗ = ρ and
πo = πy (4) is fullﬁlled with equality – the impact of aid on productivity is exactly zero; the RCK result.
6the marginal impact of aid, on productivity, seems to diminish as the size of the inﬂow
rises. However, the interaction between policies and aid turns out to be insigniﬁcant.
Hence, to a signiﬁcant extent the recent debate in the literature has been about second-
order derivatives; the question of the relative importance of ∂2y∗/∂x∂π vs. ∂2y∗/∂x2.
Where Burnside and Dollar ﬁnd that ∂2y∗/∂x∂π > 0, others have argued that ∂2y∗/∂x2 <
0, while ∂2y∗/∂x∂π is insigniﬁcant. From a theoretical perspective little can be said about
the relative merits of these diﬀerent claims; both are a priori reasonable. As a result, it
is an issue that has to be resolved empirically.
A third hypothesis which ﬂows from the model is that fundamental (non-political) struc-
tural charactaristics matter for the return to foreign aid. In theory these are factors which
generate level diﬀerences in productivity and as a result matter for the return to invest-
ments. In terms of equation (5) these factors are encompassed in “δ”. Likely candidates
are the institutional framework of individual economies and/or various climate-related
circumstances.6 The observation that climate/geographic variables are strongly related
to the growth performance of individual countries is not a novel notion. For example,
Ram (1997) adds a variable measuring the distance to equator to an otherwise stan-
dard Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) regression, and ﬁnds it to be highly signiﬁcant.
Likewise, the work surveyed in Sachs (2001) suggests that diﬀerences in climate appears
to make a diﬀerence in terms of how eﬀectively capital and labor combine to produce
output. Controversy remains as to whether climatic variables aﬀect economic outcomes
directly, or only matter for productivity indirectly – through institutions say. This latter
hypothesis is examined in Hall and Jones (1999), who ﬁnd ”distance to the equator” to be
a viable instrument for present day institutional quality. In a similar vein, Acemoglu et
al (2001) provide an intriguing discussion of how mortality patterns for European settlers
in the late 19th century may have inﬂuenced current institutions, and ultimately output
per capita, within ex-colonies. Whatever the ﬁnal outcome of this debate will turn out
to be, the model suggests that aid, aside from potentially featuring diminishing returns
and being intertwined with policies, may also be dependent on such ”deep” determinants
of productivity. The next sections confront these theoretical possibilities with data.
3 Aid Transfers and Growth Regressions
It should be clear by now that much of the current discussion centers around the question
if bad policies – in addition to being detrimental to growth – implies that aid is wasted.
As we have indicated above this is a question of second-order derivatives in growth models
for which there is little theoretical guidance. As a consequence, Barro-style growth regres-
sions on panel data have been used extensively in the controversy about the importance
of good policy in aid receiving countries.
The origin of the debate was the analysis by Burnside and Dollar, ﬁrst circulated as a
6To our knowledge, the only study examining this sort of an interaction is Guillaumont and Chau-
vet (2001) who argue that aid eﬀectiveness depends on the ”external environment”. Guillaumont and
Chauvet create an index of external vulnerability based on stability measures of the agricultrual pro-
duction, international trade and the size of the population and ﬁnd that higher vulnerability increases
the returns to aid. Guillaumont and Chauvet also consider climate related diﬀerences, but they embed
these diﬀerences in the volatility of agricultural value added.
7World Bank working paper in 1996-97, later published in the American Economic Review
(Burnside and Dollar, 1997, 2000). The results of this analysis also provided part of the
scientiﬁc background for the policy recommendations in the World Bank policy research
report Assessing Aid (World Bank, 1998). The basic result was that aid spurs growth,
but only in countries with suﬃently good macroeconomic performance. This inﬂuence
of policy on the marginal impact of aid on growth was introduced in regressions via an
interaction term between aid and a policy index, later referred to as the Burnside-Dollar
policy index.
In many ways the Burnside-Dollar model deﬁned the battleground in terms of control
and policy variables, therefore we recast the Burnside and Dollar results in Table 1,
regressions (1) and (2).7
The dependent variable is the average growth rate in real GDP per capita over six four
year epochs, starting in 1970-73 and ending with 1990-93. The ﬁrst control variable is the
logarithm of initial GDP per capita. The next three controls, ethnic fractionalization, as-
sassinations and the product of the two, are included to control for the impact of political
instability. The number of assassinations vary over time while ethnic fractionalization is
time invariant. Next, institutional quality, is controlled for using ICRG from Knack and
Keifer (1995), while the development of ﬁnancial markets is taken into account using M2
as a percentage of GDP. The list of standard controls is completed by the two regional
dummies for Sub-Saharan Africa and (fast growing) East Asia.
Turning to policy, Burnside and Dollar use three measures to create a simple index of
good policy; the budget surplus, inﬂation and trade openness, where openness is the
indicator introduced by Sachs and Warner (1995).8
Finally, aid is included in the regressions. Burnside and Dollar use the aid variable
constructed by Chang, Fernandez-Arias and Serven (1998) (i.e., ”Eﬀective Development
Assistance”). In the regressions aid is given as percentage of GDP.
Regression (1) in Table 1 has two policy interaction terms; aid × policy and aid squared
× policy. Regression (2) excludes ﬁve observations and restricts the model by excluding
the second interaction term. The regressions are identical to Burnside and Dollar (2000),
Table 4, OLS-regressions (4) and (5), and as seen we obtain the same results: The impact
of aid appears to be a positive function of the level of policy, and – in regression (1) – a
negative function of the level of aid. This is the empirical background for the claim that
aid only works in a good policy environment.
While numerous writers have over the years suggested that a link between aid and policies
might be present, disagreement has always existed about the identiﬁcation of exactly
which policies are crucial. Hence, if the three policies emphasized by Burnside and Dollar
were robust determinants of the return on aid, this would indeed have been an important
discovery. From this perspective, it is disappointing that the above aid eﬀectiveness result
did not stand up to closer scrutiny. The studies by Dalgaard and Hansen (2001), Hansen
and Tarp (2000, 2001), Hudson and Mosley (2001), Lensink and White (2001) and Lu
and Ram (2001) all test an interaction term between the Burnside-Dollar policy index
7The data set is from Burnside and Dollar (2000).
8The speciﬁc weights of each component in the index (6.85, -1.4, 2.16) are based on a growth regression
that excludes aid.
8Table 1: Aid-growth regressions with and without geograpical interaction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimation method OLS OLS 2SLS OLS OLS 2SLS
Initial GDP per capita (log) −0.55 −0.60 0.01 −0.50 −0.54 −0.06
(0.95) (1.02) (0.02) (0.90) (0.96) (0.07)
Ethnic fract. −0.43 −0.43 0.58 0.12 0.12 1.03
(0.57) (0.58) (0.59) (0.16) (0.16) (1.08)
Assissanations −0.45∗ −0.45∗ −0.45∗ −0.39 −0.38 −0.37
(1.66) (1.68) (1.70) (1.55) (1.55) (1.58)
Assassinations x Ethnic fract. 0.80∗ 0.79∗ 0.88∗ 0.71∗ 0.70 0.72∗
(1.75) (1.75) (1.92) (1.65) (1.63) (1.69)
Institutional quality 0.67∗∗ 0.69∗∗ 0.87∗∗ 0.659∗∗ 0.69∗∗ 0.80∗∗
(3.79) (3.93) (3.86) (3.73) (4.02) (3.77)
M2/GDP, lagged 0.02 0.01 0.01 −0.01 −0.02 −0.02
(1.11) (0.82) (0.45) (0.92) (1.54) (0.96)
Sub-Saharan Africa −1.86∗∗ −1.89∗∗ −3.00∗∗ −1.60∗∗ −1.58∗∗ −2.67∗∗
(2.44) (2.43) (3.32) (2.10) (2.04) (3.09)
East Asia 1.21∗∗ 1.32∗∗ 1.33∗∗ 1.42∗∗ 1.57∗∗ 1.95∗∗
(2.03) (2.22) (2.01) (2.36) (2.63) (2.94)
Burnside-Dollar policy index 0.78∗∗ 0.71∗∗ 0.96∗∗ 0.86∗∗ 0.78∗∗ 0.83∗∗
(3.77) (3.60) (6.27) (4.26) (4.05) (5.67)
Aid (EDA/GDP %) 0.05 −0.02 1.35∗∗ 1.54∗∗ 1.49∗∗ 2.47∗∗
(0.40) (0.10) (2.55) (4.07) (3.92) (4.15)
Aid × policy index 0.20∗∗ 0.18∗∗ 0.05 0.09
(2.05) (2.58) (0.05) (1.34)
Aid squared × policy index −0.02∗∗ −0.01
(2.18) (0.60)
Aid squared −0.13∗∗ −0.10∗
(2.61) (1.94)
Fraction of land in tropics −0.62 −0.70 −1.47∗∗
(1.16) (1.32) (2.14)
Aid × fract. of land in tropics −1.49∗∗ −1.52∗∗ −1.34∗∗
(3.84) (4.02) (2.19)
Test of orthogonality/exogeneity (p-values)
Aid regressors 0.03 0.04
Lagged aid instruments 0.92 0.95
All overidentiying restrictions 0.83 0.98
Partial R2 in the ﬁrst stage regressionsa
Aid 0.53 0.65
Aid squared 0.46 0.44
Aid × fract. of land in tropics 0.64
Observations 275 270 223 275 270 223
Countries 56 56 56 56 56 56
Root MSE 2.89 2.88 3.02 2.80 2.78 2.93
Notes: The dependent variable is real per capita GDP growth. All regressions include time dummies.
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Instruments in regression (5): Aid, Aid squared and aid x policy,
all lagged one period, Franc Zone dummy, policy x initial GDP per capita, policy x (initial GPD per
capita squared) policy x log of population. In regression (6) the instrument aid x fraction of land in
tropics, lagged is added. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%. aThe partial R2 from the ﬁrst
stage regressions takes the presence of several endogenous variables into account. See Shea (1997) and
Goodfrey (1999).
9and aid, using either diﬀerent data sets, diﬀerent regression speciﬁcations or diﬀerent
estimators. They all ﬁnd the interaction to be statistically insigniﬁcant. Moreover, when
Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2003) reestimate the exact Burnside and Dollar model
using an updated and extented dataset, they also end up concluding that the aid-policy
interaction is insigniﬁcant. To our knowledge, the only study supporting the Burnside-
Dollar interaction term is Collier and Dehn (2001). They include measures of export
price shocks in the regression model, but this result appears sensitive to alternative
measurements of the export price shocks. To complete the picture some studies actually
ﬁnd a negative interaction eﬀect. In particular, Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001) ﬁnd
a negative interaction eﬀect between aid and policies when they include the interaction
between vulnerability and aid. And more recently, Harms and Lutz (2003) ﬁnd that
while the impact of aid on private foreign investment is close to zero in countries with an
average regulatory burden (their policy indicator of choice) it is signiﬁcantly positive in
countries that impose a high regulatory burden.
Based on the theoretical model in section 2, the diﬃculty in ﬁnding a clear and positive
estimate of interaction between policies and aid should not be regarded as an empirical
curiosity. The potential complexity of the interaction between aid and ”policy” is also
demonstrated, within a modiﬁed RCK model, by Dalgaard and Hansen (2001). In their
model, aid increases the level of consumption yielding less socio-political instability, which
is good for growth.9 Government activity is limited to raising taxes and providing public
goods. Examples of the latter include a well-functioning court system, public security
and so forth. In this example, good policies tend to reduce the ramiﬁcations of social un-
rest. Now, suppose aid only works through reducing instability, and suppose government
intervention gradually manages to remove the harmful eﬀects of social discontent (i.e., in
terms of capital accumulation). In that case, the actions of the government will in fact
tend to reduce the return on aid. Nevertheless, government actions are, by themselves,
stimulating growth.10
We view this as a simple illustration of a more general idea. In practice, aid is likely
to aﬀect growth through a host of channels. As a result, the return to aid is likely to
be aﬀected by numerous and widely diﬀering policy measures. Some policies may be
substitutes for aid inﬂows (as in the example above), while others are better perceived of
as complements. This implies that a composite index of policies may encapsulate some
components that enhance the return to aid, while others diminish this impact. In the
end, the net eﬀect may well turn out insigniﬁcant.
Aside from provoking a heated debate on policy conditionality and selectivity in allocating
aid, the Burnside and Dollar analysis also stimulated a series of results about non-linear
eﬀects of aid on growth. Indeed, the single most common result in recent empirical
studies is that aid has a positive impact on real GDP per capita growth, but displays
diminishing returns (Dalgaard and Hansen, 2001; Hansen and Tarp, 2000, 2001; Lensink
and White, 2001). A possibly related ﬁnding is that instability of aid inﬂows appears
to have a negative inﬂuence on growth, while the level of inﬂows has a positive impact
(Lensink and Morrissey, 2000).
9The basic idea that foreign aid may buy political stability was suggested long ago by Chenery and
Strout (1966).
10See also Harms and Lutz (2003) who provide another theoretical argument for the negative policy/aid
interaction.
10Regression (3) in Table 1 illustrates the diminishing returns result as it was given in
Dalgaard and Hansen (2001, Table 4, regression (8)). We have chosen to present this
result because it is based on exactly the same data as the Burnside and Dollar regres-
sions. The main diﬀerence is that Dalgaard and Hansen use 2SLS with a diﬀerent set
of instruments compared to the 2SLS regressions in Burnside and Dollar (2000).11 As
seen, the regression indicates that there are diminishing returns to aid, as the variable
’aid squared’ enters with a signiﬁcant, negative parameter. Importantly, the study by
Dalgaard and Hansen performs a general-to-speciﬁc test which ultimately lend unique
support to the ”diminishing returns” speciﬁcation.
Finally, we take a ﬁrst pass at assessing the importance of (non-political) structural
charactaristics on aid eﬀectiveness. Speciﬁcally, this is done by adding the fraction of
land in the tropics and the product of this variable and aid. The motivation for using
this climate-related variable should be clear from the work of Bloom and Sachs (1998),
Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger (1999) and Sachs (2001,2003) who all show that geography, in
the form of tropical land area, tropical diseases (malaria) or landlockedness, signiﬁcantly
inﬂuences growth in GDP per capita from 1965 to 1990. From this one may infer that
climatic variables appear to represent structural charactaristic with direct bearing on
the growth process. Still, an alternative view is that ”geography” rather proxies for
other (endogenous, but low frequency) structural charactarics. As already mentioned,
Acemoglu et al. (2001) oﬀer an alternative explanation by relating geography to the nature
of institutions created by European settlers and Easterly and Levine (2003) ﬁnd evidence
that the geographic endowments aﬀect development only through institutions. Thus,
although the precise channels through which geography impacts on growth are currently
an area of debate, the exogeneity of tropical land area would appear unquestionable over
the time horizon in question in the aid eﬀectiveness and allocation debate.
Regressions (4) and (5) thus augment the Burnside-Dollar models by the above mentioned
variables: The fraction of land in the tropics and an interaction term involving aid. The
result is that the much discussed interaction between aid and policy once more becomes
statistically insigniﬁcant, while aid and the interaction between aid and the fraction of
land in the tropics are both highly signiﬁcant. Aid has a strong positive impact on growth
outside the tropical region, while the impact is much smaller in the tropics. In regression
(6) we test the Dalgaard-Hansen speciﬁcation. When we add the interaction between
aid and the fraction of land in the tropical region in regression (6), the squared term
becomes only marginally signiﬁcant while the interaction between aid and the tropics is,
once again, highly signiﬁcant.12
In sum, when we augment two of the competing models of aid eﬀectiveness by a climate
dependent impact of aid there is a statistical preference for the climate related speciﬁca-
tion. This result may, of course, be due to some form of misspeciﬁcation of the model.
The problem that ﬁrst comes to mind is the possible endogeneity, not only of aid, but
also of policies and institutions.
11We discuss endogeneity of aid and policies in detail below.
12In addition to the results shown in Table 1 we have also tested the signiﬁcance of the climate related
interaction in the full model, including both the aid policy interations and aid squared using diﬀerent
estimators (OLS, and robust regression) and with varying samples (including and excluding outliers in
the regressor space). The results are that the climate related interaction is signiﬁcant while the policy
interactions and the squared aid term are insigniﬁcant.
113.1 Endogeniety and aid regressions
Endogeneity of aid in the growth regression has been recognized and discussed at least
since Papanek (1972), and almost all of the recent aid eﬀectiveness studies test for biases
in the estimated parameters resulting from endogeneity of aid. Most studies accept the
null of valid inference form OLS regressions, with Dalgaard and Hansen (2001) as the
exception.13 The recent debate about the growth impact of institutions has added policies
and institutions to the list of (potentially) endogenous regressors.
One may wonder whether the endogeniety of aid, in practice, is much of a problem. If
aid allocations are based on past income levels, which may not be good predictors of
future growth in poor places, it seems likely that the (classical) endogeniety of aid to
growth possibly is a relatively minor problem. However, there is another reason why it
is important to treat aid as an endogenous regressor in any cross-country study: Once
time-averages are employed for aid and growth, the two will be jointly endogenous.
To see this, consider a simple stylized system of equations for growth, g, aid, a, and
policies,p, based on annual observations where subscript i indexes countries and t indexes
time.
git = z1iα1 + x1itβ1(L) − θ11yit−1 + θ12(L)ait + θ13(L)pit + ε
g
it, (6a)
ait = z2iα2 + x2itβ2(L) − θ21yit−1 + θ23(L)pit + ε
a
it, (6b)
pit = z3iα3 + x3itβ3(L) + θ31yit−1 + θ32(L)ait + ε
p
it, (6c)
The three equations include 1 × Qj vectors of time invariant controls, zji and 1 × Kj
vectors time varying controls, xjit, j = 1,2,3. Some of the controls may be common
to all equations, but we assume that the system is identiﬁed. The time varying controls
are assumed to have a ﬁnite distributed lag impact on the response variables. This is
indicated by the use of mj’th-order lag polynomials, βj(L), j = 1,2,3, where L is the
lag operator such that, say, xjitβj(L) =
Pmj
s=0 xjit−sβj,s.
Equation (6a) is the growth equation, where git is the annual growth rate in GDP per
capita. The vector zi contains slow moving variables such as climate, ethno-linguistic
fractionalization etc, whereas xit contains more volatile variables, like M2/GDP. In equa-
tion (6a) we emphasize the impact of initial GDP per capita (in logs), yit−1, aid, ait, and
”policies”, pit (which for simplicity is modeled as a single variable). Interaction terms
are not introduced explicitly in the equation, as this is not essential for our discussion of
endogeneity issues.
Equation (6b) is a model of aid allocation. The vectors of control variables z2i and
x2it capture, respectively, historical and political factors, such as colonial past, support
in UN voting, and indicators of recipient needs like infant mortality and educational
attainment. These indicators and factors have been stressed in many aid allocation
studies. As in the growth equation we single out the possible impact of per capita income
and policies, although the impact of both may be zero. However, the vast majority of the
recent aid allocation studies have found a signiﬁcant negative impact of lagged income on
13However, all of the studies test for endogeneity of aid using some version of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman
test under the maintained assumption of conditional homoskedasticity. The problem is that the limiting
distributions of these tests are not always as we expect if there is conditional heteroskedasticity in the
errors.
12aid commitments and disbursements, in accordance with the overriding goal of poverty
alleviation. (See e.g., Dudley and Montemarquette, 1976; Trumbull and Wall, 1994;
Alesina and Dollar, 2000; and in particular Berth´ elemy and Tichit, 2002 for a recent,
detailed analysis).
The third equation (6c) is the equation for policy. The purpose of including a policy
equation is ﬁrst of all to show that aid and policy may be jointly endogenous even if they
have no direct inﬂuence on each other (θ23(L) = θ32(L) = 0) and, second, to illustrate
how we take into account that policy may depend on institutions. Hence, the important
aspects of the equation for policy are the possible impacts of the level of income and of
institutons.






uncorrelated with the regressors and with each other, then the parameters of the growth




it) = 0, there is no classical endogeneity problem. The identifying assumption is
the recursive structure of the system, i.e., that aid allocation and policy reacts on past
income.
However cross-country growth regressions, as the ones in Table 1, are based on time-
averaged data. In Appendix B it is shown that the three equations in (6), when averaged
over T years, can be stated in the following way:





aiτ = z2iα2 + x2iτβ2 − θ21
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piτ = z3iα3 + x3iτβ3 + θ31
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In this system all variables are averages over T years, jiτ = 1
T
PT






for each country, except for yi0, which is initial GDP per capita.
The parameters in (7) are long run parameters in the sense that they are the sums of
the distributed lag parameters, say, βj =
Pmj
s=0 βj,s ≡ βj(1), and θjn = θjn(1),j = 1,2,3




θ11 , which is the conditional correlation between yiT and yi0 divided by T to get
the impact on the annual growth rate.





iτ. These variables are time-
aggregation errors given explicitly in Appendix B. Here we just note that the aggregation
errors are in all likelihood heteroskedastic with a (possibly small) moving average com-
ponent.
In the time averaged system (7) aid and policy both depend on the average rate of
growth in GDP per capita even though they are predetermined in the original system.
This dependency arises in all time-averaged growth regressions in which the regressor
depends on past levels of income, as long as the dependency is within the period over
which we average.14 In other words, we should expect aid and policies to be endogenous
regressors in Table 1 if aid allocations and policies depend on real per capita income
lagged somewhere between one and three years.
The time-averaged system also show that it is diﬃcult to test for endogeneity of aid
14Notice that the convergence parameter, θ11, is irrelevant for this result.
13and policies because of the time-aggregation error ν
g
iτ. The error shows that all time
varying regressors (i.e., both x1iτ, aiτ, and piτ) are potentially correlated with the error
term. Unfortunately we cannot compute the magnitude of the bias without specifying the
dynamics of all variables in the system. All that can be said is that the aggregation bias is
decreasing in T. This means that in the aid-growth regressions there is a trade-oﬀ between
long averages that minimize the aggregation bias and short averages that minimize the
endogeneity bias. Whether four year averages strikes a good balance is quite unknown,
and seems diﬃcult to quantify. Yet, it is important to be aware of the problem as tests
of endogeneity of aid and policies have been based on the maintained assumption that
the time-varying controls are not (closely) correlated with the aggregation error.
Turning to the problem of ﬁnding instruments for aid, the allocation literature provides
many good candidates. Unfortunately most of the recipient needs variables, such as infant
mortality, are in all likelihood correlated with either growth and/or the level of income
and hence not valid as instruments. At ﬁrst sight, this seems to only leave the historical
and political factors, that may not be particularly helpful in the description of total aid
inﬂows to a speciﬁc country, as a single aid recipient has many donors. However, the
reduced form relation for aid shows that lagged observations of aid are highly correlated
with aid in the presence of time invariant factors. The reduced form is
aiτ = ziπ21 + xiτπ22 − π23yi0 + eiτ, (8)
where zi = [z1i,z2i,z3i], xiτ = [x1iτ,x2iτ,x3iτ] and π21,π22 and π23 are the vectors of
reduced form parameters. Lagging equation (8) one period and substituting for zi we
obtain
aiτ = aiτ−1 + ∆xiτπ22 − π23∆yi0 + ∆eiτ. (9)
As not all controls can be included in the reduced form, and because of the correlation
between the regressors and the error, we cannot expect to estimate a coeﬃcent of unity
on lagged aid. However the reduced form shows that we should expect a high correlation
between past and present aid.
To illustrate the gain from including lagged aid as an instrument in the growth regressions
we have estimated the reduced form for aid based on the choice of variables in Burnside
and Dollar (2000), and subsequently added lagged aid to this regression. We estimate
the reduced forms using two data sets; the original Burnside-Dollar data (BD), and the
updated data set compiled by Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2003) (ELR). The updated
data set includes the same variables and has the same basic structure as the original BD
data but the country coverage is larger and the data set includes the recent perod 1994-97.
Burnside and Dollar (2000, Tables 1 and 8) single out a few variables such as country
and regional indicators (Egypt, Franc Zone countries and Central America), arms imports
relative to total imports and the size of the population.15 As seen from Table 2, regressions
(1) and (2), the regional indicators are not particularly helpful in explaining the aid
allocation across countries. In fact, only one variable, the size of the population, appears
to identify aid allocations. Moreover the F-statistics of instrument relevance in regressions
(1) and (2) indicate that the chosen set is on the border of being weak instruments. In
particular it is worth noticing that the F-statistic is actually decreasing when we add
15Larger countries receive relatively less aid per capita and as a fraction of GDP; this is termed ”the
small country bias” in the allocation literature.
14Table 2: Reduced form aid regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Data set BD ELR BD ELR
Real GDP per capita (log) −1.81∗∗ −1.37∗∗ −0.72∗∗ −0.50∗∗
(8.35) (5.54) (3.34) (3.25)
Ethnic fract. −0.02 −0.66 −0.08 −0.16
(0.06) (1.06) (0.32) (0.74)
Assissanations 0.19∗ 0.15 0.13∗ 0.19∗
(1.79) (1.40) (1.77) (1.72)
Assassinations x Ethnic fract. −0.34∗∗ −0.18 −0.24∗ −0.31
(2.00) (0.84) (1.93) (1.62)
Institutional quality 0.16 0.02 0.001 0.02
(1.44) (0.27) (0.01) (0.54)
M2/GDP, lagged 0.02 0.02 0.02 −0.002
(1.11) (1.73)∗ (0.80) (0.51)
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.49∗ 0.09 −0.03 0.14
(1.73) (0.20) (0.14) (0.68)
East Asia 0.11 0.25 0.16 0.31∗∗
(0.43) (0.86) (0.80) (2.55)
Policy indexa −0.05 −0.04∗ −0.09 −0.04∗∗
(0.48) (1.76) (1.09) (2.98)
Population (log) −0.69∗∗ −0.62∗∗ −0.28∗∗ −0.26∗∗
(6.10) (5.07) (3.42) (3.52)
Arms imports (lagged) 0.02 0.02 0.01 2.01∗∗
(1.34) (1.84)∗ (1.33) (2.12)
Egypt 0.62 −0.47 −0.41 −0.15
(0.83) (0.58) (0.46) (0.66)
Franc Zone countries 0.11 0.30 −0.18 0.08
(0.25) (0.72) (0.55) (0.35)
Central America 0.01 −0.47 −0.02 −0.11
(0.05) (1.06) (0.08) (0.55)
Lagged aid 0.83∗∗ 0.69∗∗
(7.31) (7.88)
Observations 236 318 236 318
Countries 54 62 54 62
R-squared 0.64 0.49 0.82 0.78
F-test of instruments 11.76 7.70 23.72 31.49
Note: The dependent variable is aid as percentage of GDP. All regressions include time dum-
mies. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust t-statistics in parentheses. * Signiﬁcant
at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%. a The weights forming the policy index are (6.85, -1.4, 2.16) in
regressions (1) and (3) and (1.26, -1.91, 2.47) in regressions (2) and (4).
15more data, and below ten in regression (2). In regressions (3) and (4) we add lagged
aid and, as expected from the arguments given above, this improves the ﬁt substantially.
Moreover, the F-statistic of instrument relevance is now far above ten and increasing
when we add more data.
One last thing to note about the reduced forms in Table 2 is that aid allocations respond
to lagged income. This underlines the importance of modelling aid as an endogenous
regressor.
Obviously, lagged aid is not a valid instrument if it is correlated with the time-average
error, ν
g
iτ. Therefore it is important to test for the validity of these instruments (and
by implication for serial correlation in the errors). In the 2SLS regressions in Table 1
we speciﬁcally test for endogeneity of the lagged aid instruments and, as seen, using the
diﬀerence-in-criterion function test (or diﬀ-Sargan test), which is robust to heteroskedas-
ticity we cannot reject the hypothesis that the lagged aid instruments are uncorrelated
with the errors.
The next issue which needs to be adressed is the possible endogeneity of institutions, and
the consequences this might have on the identiﬁcation of the impact of aid on growth.
As is well known, there has been an extensive and innovative search for good instruments
for instiutions. However, in the present study we are not particularly interested in the
impact of institutions on long run growth. Our primary objective is to ensure that
the results with respect to the impact of aid on growth are not driven by endogenous
diﬀerences in institutions. Therefore, instead of using instruments for the historically
determined component of institutions–as it is termed by Acemoglu et al. (2003) –we
simply “remove” this eﬀect by ﬁrst diﬀerencing the growth equation (7a). Hence, in
addition to standard pooled panel GMM-regressions with endogenous aid and policies we
will also look at panel GMM-regressions of ﬁrst diﬀerences. The estimator by Arellano
and Bond (1991), often denoted DIF-GMM, and the estimator proposed by Blundell and
Bond (1996), denoted SYS-GMM, are both frequently used to estimate dynamic panel
data models with unobserved heterogeneity. In the present setting they are ideal choices
for eliminating the impact of time invariant (and slowly changing) institutions while at
the same time accounting for possible endogeneity of aid and policies. In essence, we
identify the impact of aid and policies by negation: eventhough we do not formulate
structural models for aid and policies, we do know that the estimated impact in the
diﬀerenced growth model is not driven by cross-country variation in institutions.
Turning to the empirical results, Table 3 reports a number of growth regressions in which
we pursue the hypothesis that aid’s impact is a function of climate related diﬀerences
across countries.16 The results in Table 3 are based on the updated and extended data
set computed by Easterly et al. (2003). The regressions cover up to 65 countries and
6 periods (1974-77 to 1994-97) using data in the period 1970-73 as instruments in the
GMM-regressions (2)-(6). In contrast to the regressions in Table 1 we have excluded
the measures of political instability (ethnic fractionalization and assassinations), further-
more we include the three policy measures; budget surplus, inﬂation and trade openness,
individually instead of a policy index.
Moving from left to right in Table 3 we look at the robustness of aid impact when we let
16The regressions in Table 3 were carried out using DPD for Ox. See Doornik et al. (2001).
16Table 3: Assessing the impact of endogeneity of aid, policies and institutions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimation method OLS GMM GMM GMM-DIF GMM-SYS
Initial GDP per capita (log) −0.68∗∗ −0.82∗∗ −0.80∗∗ −2.62 −0.93
(1.99) (2.22) (2.04) (1.42) (1.07)
Institutional quality 0.43∗∗ 0.47∗∗ 0.51∗∗
(3.32) (3.67) (3.68)
Sub-Saharan Africa −1.07∗ −1.65∗∗ −1.03∗∗
(1.87) (3.38) (1.97)
East Asia 2.69∗∗ 2.49∗∗ 2.41∗∗
(3.85) (3.78) (3.44)
Fraction of land in tropics −1.31∗∗ −1.67∗∗ −1.73∗∗
(3.02) (3.74) (3.96)
Budget surplus 0.08 0.08 0.03 0.14 0.13
(1.28) (1.33) (0.31) (1.18) (1.30)
Inﬂation −1.97∗∗ −2.09∗∗ −1.24∗∗ −2.25 −1.54
(3.44) (3.97) (2.32) (1.53) (1.34)
Sachs-Warner openness 0.45 0.48 1.09∗ −1.07 0.21
(0.85) (1.07) (1.72) (0.67) (0.14)
Aid 0.60∗∗ 0.34∗∗ 0.33∗∗ 1.31∗∗ 0.87∗∗
(4.70) (3.27) (2.66) (8.99) (4.86)
Aid x fract. of land in tropics −0.77∗∗ −0.48∗∗ −0.50∗∗ −2.01∗∗ −1.52∗∗
(3.10) (2.40) (2.51) (3.65) (3.89)
Impact of aid in the tropics −0.17 −0.13 −0.17 −0.70 −0.65∗∗
(1.37) (1.03) (1.30) (1.45) (1.98)
Test of residual autocorrelation
First order 0.48 0.44 0.50 −3.19∗∗ −3.11∗∗
[0.63] [0.66] [0.62] [0.00] [0.00]
Second order 1.56 1.39 1.31 1.30 1.30
[0.12] [0.16] [0.19] [0.20] [0.19]
Hansen J-test (p-value) 0.13 0.48 1.00 1.00
Partial R2 in the ﬁrst stage regressions
Aid 0.72 0.62




Observations 332 316 303 306 361
Countries 65 65 63 63 63
Root MSE 3.02 3.03 3.04 3.06 3.20
Notes: The dependent variable is real per capita GDP growth. All regressions include time dummies.
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. The t-statistics in regressions (4) and (5)are based on small sample
corrected covariance estimates; see Windmeijer (2000). Instruments in regression (2): Aid, aid squared,
aid x inﬂation and aid x openness, aid x fraction of land in tropics, M2/GDP, all lagged one period, and
log(population). In regression (3) the instruments Budget surplus, inﬂation and openness, all lagged one
period, are added. Regression (4) adds all possible lags of real per capita GDP growth and initial GDP
per capita, and include all available lags of the instruments used in regressions (3) and (4). * signiﬁcant
at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%.
17more and more regressors be endogenous. In essence we ”gain” robustness in terms of
consistency while we ”sacriﬁce” eﬃciency in terms of increasing parameter variances.
Starting with regression (1) we ﬁnd, using pooled OLS, that aid has a positive impact on
growth. Across countries the impact is smaller in countries with large fractions of land
in the tropics. This result is the same as in Table 1, although the estimated impact is
somewhat smaller using the updated data set. In regression (2) we use instruments for aid
to assess the possible bias in regression (1). There is a fairly large drop in the estimated
impact of aid but the impact is still highly signiﬁcant (outside the tropics). Moving to
regression (3) we add the three policy measures to the list of endogenous regressors, using
the lagged values as instruments. This change has virtually no inﬂuence on the estimated
impact of aid.
In regressions (4) and (5) we remove the impact of institutions and other time invariant
factors by diﬀerencing. We apply the ”standard” set-up for the two GMM-estimators,
i.e., we use all possible lagged levels of growth and of the regressors as instruments.
Endogenous regressors are lagged at least twice while predetermined regressors are lagged
at least once.
Removing the impact of time invariant factors has a rather large inﬂuence on the esti-
mated impact of aid compared to the ﬁrst three regressions. Outside the tropics a one
percentage point increase in the aid/GDP ratio leads to an increase in the growth rate
in the neighbourhood of one percentage point. In the tropics the result is unchanged
compared to the level regressions; the estimated impact is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero.
As the ﬁnite sample bias in GMM-parameter estimates is increasing in the number of
moment conditions we experimented with the number of instruments in regressions (4)
and (5). While there are some changes in the results, the estimated impact of aid is
unchanged when we limit the use of instrument lags and the impact is also robust to
inclusion of the measures of political instability.17
The overriding result of the regressions is a surprising constancy of the impact of aid on
growth and of the statistical signiﬁcance of the impact. For comparison one could look at
the estimated impact of the policy measures that are either insigniﬁcant throughout (the
budget surplus) or changing from statistically signiﬁcant in the level regressions (1)-(3),
to insigniﬁcant in the diﬀerence regressions (4) and (5) (inﬂation). Moreover, when the
regressions are based on the original Burnside and Dollar data we obtain qualitatively the
same results, although the estimated impact of aid is somewhat larger and more constant
across estimators.18 Therefore we have conﬁdence in the claim that aid has a positive
impact on growth, and that the impact depends on climate related diﬀerences.
In the next section we discuss the implications of our results for the aid allocation rule
advocated in Collier and Dollar (2001).
17In contrast the results for trade openness and inﬂation are highly sensitive to the choice of instruments
and sample.
18The results are available from the authors on request.
184 The Collier-Dollar Aid Allocation Rule
In recent research Collier and Dollar (2001, 2002) try to invigorate the policy debate by
introducing the World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessment index (CPIA)
in growth regressions. They show that an interaction term between aid and CPIA has a
highly signiﬁcant, positive eﬀect, bringing us back to the claim that aid spurs growth in
a good policy environment. Moreover, Collier and Dollar take a second, logical although
not innocuous, step as they formulate an “optimal” aid allocation rule based on the
growth regressions. Collier and Dollar (2001) assert that a combination of policy reform
in Africa (improvements in the CPIA index) and an optimal aid allocation, will enable
the world society to cut poverty in half by 2015.
The basic message is that countries with low income per capita (poverty) and a high
CPIA score should be eligible for aid, while countries with a low CPIA score should not be
eligible for aid, or alternatively should receive less aid. This idea has been adopted by IDA
and the Brittish aid organization DFID.19 Hence, in a very short time the Collier-Dollar
model has moved from an academic idea (with a strong policy message) to something
very concrete in the donor community.
While we have nothing against aid allocation rules as such we question the usefulness of
introducing CPIA in growth regressions and we seriously doubt if the CPIA score should
have anything to do with the actual aid allocation.
Our concerns regarding the CPIA index are threefold: (i) Because of the construction
of the CPIA index, there is little to be learned from this index in terms of growth
performance in the ﬁrst place, (ii) the changes in the CPIA index over time may well
be ”caused” by the growth performance, in which case CPIA should not be used as an
exogenous variable in allocation models, and (iii) the use of the CPIA index in allocation
models may lead us to punish countries with unfavorable initial conditions instead of
helping them, because we confuse climate related problems with poor CPIA ratings and
”unwillingness to reform”. In what follows we will elaborate on each of these objections.
In terms of using the CPIA in growth (and poverty) regressions we ﬁnd that the lessons
to be learnt from the positive interaction term between aid and CPIA are in reality hard
to pinpoint. The strength of the original Burnside-Dollar hypothesis was the claim that
a small set of policies could be singled out as crucial. The CPIA index, on the other
hand, assesses the quality of a country’s present policy and institutional framework in
20 diﬀerent dimensions.20 Thus, in terms of drawing-up clear-cut recommendations for
policy makers on how to enhance the eﬀectiveness of aid, the analysis is not particu-
larly helpful. Trade-oﬀs between elements of the index are bound to arise in practice.
For example, placing greater emphasis on budget balance (a component of “Economic
Management”) could conceivably be in conﬂict with improving access to health care, ed-
ucation etc. (the component “Building Human Resources” which belongs to the general
group of “Policies for Social Inclusion/Equity”). In particular, it might very possibly
19See the World Bank homepage and Dyer et al. (2003).
20These 20 items are assessed by World Bank experts on a scale from 1 to 6 (measuring “unsatisfactory
for an extended period” to “good for an extended period”). Each item has a 5 percent weight in the overall
rating. The items are grouped into four categories: “Economic Management”, “Structural Policies”,
“Policies for Social Inclusion/Equity” and “Public Sector Management and Institutions”.
19Table 4: Forecasting the CPIA ratings in 2001
Overall Economic Structural Social Public sector
Index Management Policies Inclusion Management
CPIA rating in 1999 0.80 0.70 0.79 0.81 0.77
(11.95) (8.01) (12.36) (12.77) (10.89)
Growth rate 1999-00 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.05
(2.78) (3.09) (3.76) (1.81) (2.82)
Notes: The dependent variable is the CPIA rating in 2001 for 67 countries. Robust t-statistics in
parentheses. The CPIA ratings are obtained from News and Notices for IMF and World Bank Watchers,
Vol. 2. No. 3, 2000 for the 1999 ratings and No. 6, 2002 for the 2001 ratings.
lower the ‘pro-poor expenditure index’ shown to be poverty-reducing by Mosley, Hudson
and Verschoor (2003).
Our second concern is endogeneity. As already mentioned there is ample evidence, that
policies and growth are jointly endogenous variables. For example, Clague et al. (1996)
and Mauro (1995) argue that good economic performance increases institutional eﬃciency.
In relation to the CPIA index it is more interesting that Mauro goes on to highlight that
using expert evaluations may be problematic, the argument being that an evaluator is
likely to conclude that a particular set of institutions is good if the country in question
is growing rapidly.
Unfortunately, it is currently impossible to investigate directly whether endogeneity of
the CPIA index is an issue, as the data are not in the public domain. However, indirect
evidence does shed light on what further analyses are likely to ﬁnd.
We obtained data on CPIA in 1999 and 2001 from News and Notices for IMF and World
Bank Watchers, Vol. 2, No. 3, 2000 and No. 6, 2002. Even though this is not exactly
the World Bank CPIA data, it would appear to be capable of providing a pretty good
indication of the concordance between the CPIA and publicly available data.
In Table 4, we report regressions of the CPIA rating in 2001 using the rating in 1999 and
the growth rate in real GDP per capita from 1999 to 2000 as regressors.21 We expect the
ratings to be very persistent; as policies and institutions are persistent. Therefore we ﬁnd
it all the more interesting that the growth rate in GDP in a single year is able to improve
a forecast of the ratings for 2001 when we control for the ratings in 1999. Moreover, the
rate of growth seems to have explanatory power and approximately the same impact on
all four sub-groups of the overall index.
Needless to say, the ﬁndings of Granger causality in Table 4 are only indicative. However,
they are supported by the study by Chong and Calderon (2000) in which it is shown
that changes in the ICRG index are Granger caused by economic growth. This result is
relevant in the present context because we found a signiﬁcant positive correlation between
the ICRG index and our data for CPIA index.
To be sure, these insights do not per se invalidate the regression results in Collier and
Dollar (2001, 2002). However, they do justify a certain amount of skepticism regarding
the policy relevance and appropriateness of using these regressions in counter-factual
21The growth rate is calculated from the PPP-adjusted real GDP per capita available from the WDI
2002 CD-ROM.
20Table 5: Rank correlations between the fraction of land in the tropics and the CPIA
index in 2001
Overall Economic Structural Social Public sector
Index Management Policies Inclusion Management
Fraction of land in tropics −0.37 −0.40 −0.21 −0.38 −0.14
[0.00] [0.00] [0.11] [0.00] [0.25]
Notes: Spearman rank correlations with p-values for test of independence in brackets. The correlations
are based on 61 observations. The CPIA gradings for 2001 are obtained from News and Notices for IMF
and World Bank Watchers, Vol. 2, No. 6, Spring 2002.
scenarios such as re-allocation of aid based on good CPIA ratings. If the CPIA index
is Granger-caused by growth it should not be used as an exogenous variable in forecasts
and policy simulations. This rather obvious, and well known, result is unfortunately not
discussed neither in Collier and Dollar (2001, 2002) nor in the documents by IDA and
DIfD.
Our third concern is in our view the most serious problem with the Collier-Dollar alloca-
tion rule. In essence it amounts to a simple identiﬁcation problem, but it has far reaching
consequences for the optimality of the allocation rule.
Table 5 reports the rank correlations between the CPIA index and each of it’s sub-groups
in 2001 with the fraction of land in the tropics—the variable we used in the growth
regressions in the previous section. As seen, there is a very high probability that a
country having a low CPIA score is in the tropical region. Hence, the positive interaction
between aid and CPIA obtained in Collier and Dollar (2001, 2002), may well be caused
by the low impact of aid in the tropical region.
If one accepts that the impact of climate on growth is (mainly) through institutions,
then we are just stating that Collier and Dollar should instrument the CPIA index in the
growth regressions, and we have shown that the fraction of land in the tropics is in all
likelihood a good instrument.
However, when the CPIA ratings are used in ”optimal” allocation models, then there
is a considerable risk that we punish countries with climate related problems when we
”support the good performers” (high CPIA) to maximize the global economic growth
rate.
Hence, ultimately the core question may boil down to this: should we stop giving aid to
countries in the tropics? Undoubtedly, these are countries which have displayed dismal
growth performance in the last several decades, and in addition, aid seems to have been
far less eﬀective in such regions. Certainly, if the Collier-Dollar allocation rule is used
indiscriminately, this will be the result.
5 Conclusion
The need for growth and development is as great as ever if we are to come even close to
the United Nations target of halving world poverty by 2015. The central message of the
present paper is that aid can play a conducive role in reaching such a target. Our results
21show that, in many countries, aid has had a signiﬁcant positive impact on productivity.
At the same time it should be recognized that aid is not a panacea for poverty reduction.
Ultimately, aid in itself will not ensure convergence; but it can stimulate the process.
These conclusions are, we believe, commonly accepted among academics working on the
topic.
At this stage the key question to be settled is why aid works so much better in some
countries compared with others. While we ﬁnd the evidence in favor of a strong inter-
action between policy and aid weak, our empirical work reveal a disturbing and rather
robust pattern: Over the last thirty years, aid seems to have been far less eﬀective in
tropical areas. It is very hard to believe that aid, inherently, should be less potent in the
tropics. Hence the explanation is likely to be found elsewhere. Perhaps tropical areas
have particular needs in ways of foreign assistance; needs which may not so far have been
met to a suﬃcient extent? Accounting for the nature of the interaction between climate
and aid seems to be a worthwhile topic for future research. Such investigations would
surely have to move beyond the reduced-form aid regressions, which so far has dominated
the scene. Disentangling the channels through which aid matters for productivity seems
to be a crucial research topic at this stage.
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A Details of the theoretical model





From Lemma 1 in Galor and Ryder (1989) it follows that given kt > 0 there exists a
unique kt+1 > 0 that is a self-fulﬁlling expectation, since srt+1 > 0 for all rt+1. This
is straight forward to check, using equation (2). By implication there exists a singled-
valued function φ such that we can express the law of motion for capital: kt+1 = φ(kt).
Moreover, note that φ(0) = ¯ k > 0, where





























since w0 (k) > 0 and r0 (k) < 0. Thus φ
0 (kt) > 0 ∀k.
The second deriviative φ
00 (kt) is in general ambigious – it depends on the third derivative
of the underlying production function – hence multiple equilibria cannot be ruled out a
25priori. However, assuming φ
00 (kt) < 0 for all k, and in light of the fact that s(kt,kt+1;z)






























determines whether aid is eﬀective or










































































B The time averaged system of equations
B.1 The growth equation
The growth equation (6a) is an autoregressive distributed lags model for the log of income
per capita. For ease of notation we gather the time varying regressors in wit = [xit,ait,pit]
and stack β1(L),θ12(L) and θ13(L) in B(L), where we let m denote the maximum power
of the lag polynomium. Deﬁning ρ = 1 − θ11, we can now write the growth equation as




witB(L) = witB + ∆witB
∗(L)






0,...,m−1, we can reformulate the growth equation and gather the total impact (B(1))
in a single parameter matrix
yit = ziα1 + witB + ∆witB
∗(L) + ρyit−1 + ε
g
it. (11)
26The moving average representation for yiT conditional on yi0 (initial income per capita)
can now be given as









where ˜ ψ = (1 − ρT)/(1 − ρ).
Let the averages of wit and ε
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Add and subtract these averages














Subtract yi0 from both sides and divide by T to get the (log approximation of) the average
annual growth rate in GDP per capita over the period t = 1,...,T; giτ = 1
T(yiT − yi0),
then



























is the time-average error in the growth equation.
Inserting the deﬁnition of wit in (14) we obtain (7a).
B.2 The equations for aid and policy
The equations for aid and policy have similar mathematical structures. Therefore it
suﬃces to show the time-aggregation for one of the equations. Here, it is the aid allocation
equation.
Let vit = [x2it,pit] and stack β2(L) and θ23(L) in C(L), which we assume is a m-th order
polynomium. Using the same decomposition in levels and changes for vit as the one we
used for wit, the aid allocation equation can be written
ait = z2iα2 + vitC + ∆vitC
∗(L) − θ21yit−1 + ε
a
it (16)
Averaging over T years, we have








∗(L) − θ21yit−1). (17)
























(T − t − 1)∆yit + yi0
= 1





(T − t − 1)(git − giτ) + yi0
where giτ = 1
T(yiT − yi0) and git = (yit − yit−1).














where ∆T = 1 − LT such that 1
T∆viT−s is the average annual change in vi from year −s
to T − s.
Using these results the aid allocation equation averaged over T years becomse
aiτ = z2iα2 + viτC + −θ21
1




















Inserting the deﬁnition of vit in (19) results in equation (7b) in the text.
The time-averaged equation for policy follows directly.
28